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IN MEMORIAM: ADAM MALIK
A. M. Hanafi
On the evening of September 5 I received a phone call from Buyung Nasution SH 
with the sad news: "Oom, they say Pak Adam Malik died yesterday." I felt 
shocked and at the same time deeply moved. How surprising that it was Buyung 
Nasution who was prepared to phone me!1 234 If it were not for him, how would 
I have known [so soon] that my old comrade-in-arms had returned to his Maker? 
The following evening, Dr. Go Gien Tjwan also phoned. He was a close friend 
of the departed.
That Saturday I got a call from the Indonesian Embassy in Paris, informing 
me of the death of ex-Vice President Adam Malik: the protocol section of the 
Embassy would be receiving condolences up till Monday. I felt more proud 
and moved to learn that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia was officially 
declaring its grief by ordering the Red-and-White flag to be flown at halfmast 
at the death of Bung Adam Malik. I had no idea how his funeral rites were 
being arranged in Jakarta, but in the Embassy's Book of Condolences I wrote: 
"I would hope that if possible the Government will permit his family to hold 
a tahlilan * and a reading from the Qu'ran at Menteng 31, the historic headquarters 
of the Generation of '45."
#  *  *
The train of my memories hurtled back through all the twists and turns 
of the experiences I had shared with Bung Adam.
They began at the end of 1938. I met him for the first time in Buiten 
Tijgerstraat (in what used to be called Glodok). * My elder brother Asmara 
Hadi introduced me to him. Pemuda [activist youth] Adam Malik was small and 
thin; he spoke briefly but to the point (his Indonesian had a strong Medan 
accent, and once in a while his Mandailing intonation would come through); 
and he smiled a lot. * On Buiten Tijgerstraat Adam Malik got the nickname 
"Si Akoy." I heard that it was Asmara Hadi who first tagged him so. In any 
case, his close friends preferred to call him by this name—it felt warmer 
and more intimate. "Si Akoy" meant that he succeeded wonderfully in blending
1. The surprise is probably because in the crisis years of 1965-66, Buyung 
Nasution SH (today the well-known human rights advocate) was a rising New 
Order activist, while Hanafi, identified with the left, was being driven into 
exile.
2. Tahlilan—chants in praise of Allah.
3. The old Chinese quarter of Batavia/Jakarta, located at the north end of 
the city.
4. Adam Malik was born to the Nasution marga of the Mandailing Batak people, 
but in adult life dropped his marga name.
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in with his neighbors, most of whom were Chinese families. In fact the whole 
group of Indonesian pemuda who shared a house on Buiten Tijgerstraat (Adam 
Malik, Sipatuhar, Pandu Kartawiguna and Hakim) were accepted without problems 
by the local Chinese inhabitants.
The context of my first meeting with Bung Adam was my bringing him, directly 
from Bengkulu, a secret letter from Bung Kamo.* Bung Kamo had sent me to 
Batavia (the old name for Jakarta) so that I could "drink the holy water of 
the movement tpergerakan]," as Bung Kamo put it. From the moment we met 
and became friends Adam Malik and I were never separated as comrades-in-arms: 
from the time of Achieving Indonesia's Independence,* through the Revolution 
and the period of establishing the Republic, to the very end of his days. 
With the deaths of my old Pemuda Pelopor Proklamasi [lit.—Youths Pioneering 
the Proclamation of Independence] friends, like Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh, Wikana—and 
now Bung Adam Malik too—I don’ t know how many still survive of the Komitd 
van Aksi Eleven5 67 89 (i.e., the eleven members of its leadership), who ignited 
the Revolution of August *45. NICA of course called them "a gang of young 
extremists." * But it was they who kicked open the Gateway of National Independence 
by pressing the National Leadership, Bung Kamo and Bung Hatta, from Rengasdengklok 
to Pengangsaan Timur 56, to announce the Proclamation—not on the 18th, but 
on the 17th of August 1945! * Each time the anniversary of the Proclamation 
is celebrated, their names are always set aside—not by History, but by political 
considerations, in the interests of what they call "national harmony and unity."
The Revolution of August 17 ’45 was not something dreamed up by "youth 
extremists" in een slaplooze nacht [in one sleepless night]—though to be 
sure they never closed an eye from the time Bung Kamo and Bung Hatta returned 
from Saigon.10 It was the product of a determination to struggle ignited
5. In February 1938 Sukarno was moved by the colonial authorities from Flores 
(where he had spent four years of "internal exile") to Bengkulu. There he 
made the acquaintance of the twenty-year-old Hanafi.
6. A reference to a famous brochure issued by Sukarno in March 1933. Here 
it is used figuratively for the focus of nationalist politics during the last 
decade of Dutch colonial rule.
7. Eleven is meant in the double English sense—the number 11 and [football] 
team.
8. NICA—Netherlands Indies Civil Administration—the skeleton administration 
set up in late 1945 by the returning Dutch colonialists.
9. On Rengasdengklok see below, note 26. Pegangsaan Timur 56 was Sukarno's 
private home in 1945. It was in his front yard, on the morning of August 17th, 
that the Proclamation of Independence was first pronounced. The promulgation 
had (more or less) been scheduled for the 18th by the Japanese-sponsored Committee 
for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence, but Hanafi and his fellow pemuda, 
anxious to have a Proclamation completely free of Japanese taint, attempted 
(successfully) to have it announced a day early, and not in an official venue.
10. Summoned by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, the Japanese supremo for 
the "Southern Areas," Sukarno and Hatta arrived in Saigon on August 11. Terauchi 
informed them that Tokyo had given the go-ahead for them to proclaim an independent 
Indonesia within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The pair left 
for home on the 13th, and reached Jakarta on the 14th. The Emperor Hirohito 
broadcast Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allies the following day.
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by the action-program for Achieving Indonesian Independence with the blood 
and the souls of the pemuda themselves—from the collapse of the Dutch Indies 
Empire under the boots of General Imamura at Kali Jati,11 123right through the 
Japanese Occupation without a break, up to the savage and horrifying explosion 
of Allied atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Indeed, the long-smoldering 
sparks of armed revolution had been spread by those "young extremists" from 
the very start of the Japanese Occupation.
On his release from the prison at Nusakembangan, 11 my elder brother Asmara 
Hadi told me that Bung Adam alias Si Akoy was looking for me, as well as Sukarni 
and Chaerul Saleh. The reason was that Bung Kamo was greatly concerned to 
gather round him "seasoned youths" [pemuda gemblengan] as he spurred the Horse 
of Opportunity to Achieve Indonesian Independence by [tactical] cooperation 
with the Japanese.
Why was it we three whom Bung Adam sought? It was pretty clear to me he'd 
talked things over with Bung Karno. After all, Sukarni was a radical pemuda 
leader, who'd always worked underground; to be sure an admirer of Tan Malaka, 
but also willing to accept Bung Karno as his leader. 14 Chaerul Saleh was a 
pemuda intellectual, a student at the Law Faculty and Chairman of the PPPI.14 
As for me, people said "he's an anak mas1* of Bung Karno," but I myself don’ t 
believe this. In political matters, family and anak mas were always secondary 
for Bung Karno. I think I was picked because I was secretary-general of the 
Barisan Pemuda Gerindo, and thus had an "intact" underground organization 
during the Japanese Occupation.14 Anyway, Bung Adam invited the three of us 
to a meeting at his house, to prepare a struggle-program and to defend Bung 
Karno. By that time Bung Adam no longer lived on Buiten Tijgerstraat: his 
old house had been torn apart by the PID as Dutch colonialism lay in its death 
throes.17 He was now sharing a house with Imam Sutardjo on Gang Arab in Sawah 
Besar. The product of this meeting was the establishment of the Asrama Angkatan
11. On March 8, 1942, General ter Poorten, commander of the Netherlands Indies 
Army, surrendered to the Japanese CO General Imamura at Kali Jati, just outside 
Bandung, after putting up a brief, ignominious fight.
12. A small island off the southern coast of Java, it was, in colonial and 
later times, a notorious "maximum security" prison for hardened criminals 
and political offenders.
13. Tan Malaka, the celebrated Minangkabau revolutionary, had been chairman of 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1921-22, before being forced into exile. 
He strongly opposed the disastrous PKI uprising of 1926-27, and subsequently 
he formed his own revolutionary party PARI (Partai Republik Indonesia) from 
his place of refuge in Bangkok.
14. PPPI—Perhimpunan Peladjar-Peladjar Indonesia (Association of Indonesian 
Students)--was the most radical of the student associations of the immediate 
prewar period.
15. Anak mas-favorite pupil or follower.
16. Gerindo was the most left-leaning of the legal nationalist political 
parties in the late colonial period. Its youth arm (Barisan Pemuda), headed 
by Wikana, included some Communists, and was involved in the early anti-Japanese 
resistance.
17. Politieke Inlichtingendienst (Political Intelligence Service)—the colonial 
secret police.
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Baru Indonesia [Asrama of the New Generation of Indonesia] at Menteng 31, which 
opened in August 1942, with Sukarno as Chairman, Chaerul Saleh as Vice-Chairman, 
and A. M. Hanafi as Secretary. Bung Adam himself continued to run the press 
agency Antara, which was later transformed into Domei by the Japanese.1* Still, 
there was always close cooperation and division of revolutionary tasks between 
us and Bung Adam. The establishment of the Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia was 
the first step in the aksi12 of the Proclamation Youth, and it was also the 
first youth organization of the Japanese period—preceding the Poetera, the 
Djawa Hokokai, e tc .10
At that time I regarded Bung Adam as a pejuang [freedom fighter] sympathetic 
to Tan Malaka's PARI. His personality was attractive, his political insight was 
brilliant, and he was very good at getting along with others in the pergerakan 
[nationalist movement]. After his brother, Yahya Malik Nasution, was sent to 
Digul by the Dutch, many people (including, of course, the PID!)*1 saw Bung 
Adam as his successor in carrying on the struggle of PARI. That was why Sukarni 
was so close to him, for Sukarni admitted frankly that he was a cadre of Tan 
Malaka’s PARI. But in the struggle to Achieve Indonesian Independence, ideology 
was not a matter of fundamental importance—everyone wanted Indonesian Inde­
pendence. Let the followers of each ideology compete (but not at each other's 
expense!);21 history will decide which one reaches the finishing line first. 
This was also why Bung Kamo as National Unifier was [always] a central factor. 
Everyone agreed that Bung Karno was a Symbol of the Revolution. Still, I 
was often at my wit's end when Sukarni and Wikana (a follower of the PKI-Musso) 
were together.21 Usually Bung Adam and I had to act as "Referees," to part 
them when they were at the point of blows. That was also the reason why I 
was all the more keen to establish firmly Bung Kamo's "unity" political line.
The Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia was quite different from the abortive 
"Pemuda Angkatan Baru" [New Generation Youth] which was born and died in July 
1945. To be sure, the sponsors of the "Pemuda Angkatan Baru Indonesia” were 
more or less the same people, including Bung Adam, B. M. Diah, and others. 
But the newborn organization was destroyed by the Japanese after it announced 
its opposition to the formation of the Gerakan Rakyat Baru24—which did not 1892034
18. Domei was the official wartime Japanese news agency.
19. Aksi—from the Dutch actie—means something like "mass political action."
20. The two largest and most important political organizations sponsored 
and controlled by the Japanese Occupation authorities.
21. Digul (Boven Digul) was the notorious political concentration camp set up 
by the Dutch colonial authorities in the malarial swamps of southern West Irian.
22. An allusion to the famous formulation of the respected prewar nationalist 
leader Dr. Soetomo: pro-independence groups should emulate one another to 
promote independence, not compete with one another for power.
23. The veteran Communist Musso had secretly returned to Indonesia in 1935 
and tried to revive the PKI, which had been shattered in the repression following 
the failed uprising of 1926-27. Musso and his group violently denounced Tan 
Malaka as a "Trotskyist" who had undermined the party's unity by his vocal 
opposition to the uprising.
24. The last Japanese-sponsored organization of the Occupation period, it 
represented a final attempt to mobilize all indigenous groups behind the Japanese 
war effort. It collapsed, partly because of pemuda opposition, but mainly
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dare include demands for "Indonesian Independence Now" in the shape of a sovereign 
People’ s Republic [in its program]. The GRB was thus stillborn. The youth 
leaders were hunted down by the Japanese. I myself was jailed in Glodok Prison, 
and was only released through the intervention of Pak Haji (Agus Salim).**
Bung Adam Malik's role and participation during the Proclamation Days 
only made us admire and value him the more. The history of the Revolution 
of August 1945 has made the name of the village of Rengasdengklok famous.** 
Possibly there would have been no Proclamation of August 17 if there had been 
no "Rengasdengklok Affair." A mere hypothesis? Ah, were it not for the Pemuda 
Pelopor Proklamasi—the so-called "young extremists"~perhaps it would not 
have been Bung Kamo and Bung Hatta who became President and Vice-President 
of the Republic of Indonesia. Even though the youth were violently opposed 
to everything that "stank" of the Japanese or the colonialists, still they 
firmly defended Bung Kamo and Bung Hatta against those who slandered them 
as "Japanese collaborators."
But who was it who actually decided on the Rengasdengklok operation? 
Sukarni? Chaerul Saleh? Wikana?—to mention just a few names. Who indeed? True 
enough, at the meeting at Tjikini 71 on the evening of August 15, all of us were 
united in the burning desire to have the Proclamation announced by Bung Kamo 
and Bung Hatta at Rengasdengklok, "the first liberated area of the Republik"—for 
the Peta there were ready and prepared to serve as stoottroepen [shock-troops] 
in its defense. I’m prepared to say that without Bung Adam Sukarni would have 
wavered; he’d make a big noise, he'd roar the house down, but he wouldn’ t dare 
to take a big decision without Bung Adam's support. It was only after little 
Bung Adam appeared, and Sukarni had whispered in his ear, that it was unanimously 
agreed that Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh and Jusuf Kunto would rouse Bung Kamo and 
Bung Hatta in the dead of night and take them off to Rengasdengklok. Just 
before daybreak on August 16th! If today I think back to the Rengasdengklok 
Affair, I feel pride in imagining the faces of Sukarni, Adam Malik, Chaerul 
Saleh, and Wikana. 256
because the Japanese were already close to surrender, and lost interest in it.
25. The well-known prewar maverick Islamic politician. A bitter enemy of 
the PKI, he became the Republic's Foreign Minister in 1947.
26. On the evening of August 15, 1945 (the day of the Japanese Government’s 
surrender) a group of radical pemuda, angered at the refusal of Sukarno and 
Hatta to break with the Japanese and declare Indonesia’s independence on their 
own, decided to force the two leaders’ hands. In the early hours of August 
16th, Sukarno and Hatta were abducted by a small group of these radical youths 
and taken to Rengasdengklok, a rural township an hour or two's drive northeast 
of Jakarta. There the local commander of the Peta (Fatherland Defense Force), 
an auxiliary army formed by the Japanese in 1943, had arrested the two or 
three resident Japanese military and declared a zone of freedom. Sukarno 
and Hatta, however, refused to give in, and the pemuda were forced to bring 
them back to Jakarta on the evening of the 16th. As the result of complicated 
negotiations with the Japanese authorities, a meeting of Indonesian leaders 
was held that night at the home of Admiral Maeda (liaison between the Japanese 
Navy and the Japanese Army Administration on Java, and regarded as a friend 
by many Indonesian elite politicians). By the early hours of August 17 the 
text of a proclamation of independence was worked out, and it was promulgated 
in Sukarno's front yard late that morning.
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But—and I don’ t know whether this should be regretted or not—Wikana 
(and Jusuf Kunto) leaked the secret of Rengasdengklok to Mas Bardjo (Mr. Subardjo); 
Mas Bardjo and Mbah Diro then rushed off to fetch Bung Kamo and Bung Hatta 
back to Jakarta, with the result that the text of the Proclamation was composed 
in the house of Admiral Maeda, Mas Bardjo’s Big Boss [sic]. At that time
we were furious with Wikana. Wikana was an employee of Mas Bardjo.*7
But no regrets are worth clinging to today. Everything has become history. 
The Pemuda wanted Indonesian Independence Now. Bung Karno and Bung Hatta 
too. Yes, we all wanted it. We differed on means, and were in conflict a 
bit over timing—but history united us all. This then was the destiny of 
the Indonesian Nation which we all love, and which is blessed by the Almighty: 
The Proclamation of August 17, 1945!
The first organization to be born and to step to the front of the struggle 
to establish the Republic of Indonesia was called Komitd van Aksi. (Bung Adam 
described all of this in his brochure Sekitar ProklamasU) Its headquarters
was also at Menteng 31. For the purposes of this In Memoriam, I should mention 
that the person who suggested this name (which was agreed to unanimously) was 
Bung Adam Malik. Simple, nothing fancy at all. But right on the nail for a 
nation that demanded: Action! Not "Wait a moment,” Not "See what everyone else 
is doing"—no, but "Act now" [beraksi sekarang jug a]. Tomorrow is another day, 
tomorrow the Allies will be here! *• The Komitd consisted of pemuda leaders—eleven 
men all told. That's why they were often referred to as the Menteng 31 Eleven: 
Sukarni, Wikana, Chaerul Saleh, Adam Malik, A. M. Hanafi, Pandu Kartawiguna, 
Djohar Nur, Kusnaeni alias Pancen, Darwis, Maruto Nitimihardjo, and Armunanto. 
The truth is that the Komitd van Aksi was the very first arm of the Republic,
even though it was not an official institution. Still it was independent,
and in revolutionary terms it was legitimate [sah], since its aksi served 
as guideposts which were followed by the masses in Jakarta and in the regions. 
The Komit€ van Aksi maintained itself in function at the Menteng 31 Headquarters 
until it successfully secured the move of Bung Karno and Bung Hatta to Yogyakarta 
in January 1946. *»
At Chaerul Saleh's suggestion, the Komitd van Aksi urged the immediate 
formation of a National Committee, *° and also that the Peta and Heiho automatically 278930
27. Mr. Subardjo, a well-known older generation nationalist politician, directed 
a political asrama or dormitory for Admiral Maeda during the later Occupation 
years. He protected a number of young left-wing activists, such as Wikana, 
by putting them on his payroll or into the asrama. Sudiro (mbah) was Subardjo's 
second-in-command.
28. After the official Japanese surrender, Indonesians of all political stripes 
expected an immediate landing of Allied troops. In the event this did not 
occur in any real force until the very end of September 1945.
29. A series of attempted assassinations of prominent Indonesian leaders by 
trigger-happy Dutch colonial troops (in December 1945) forced the Republican 
government to move its capital to the safety of distant Yogyakarta in January 
1946.
30. Independent Indonesia's first "parliament," formed late in August 1945 
by adding to the membership of the Japanese-era Committee for the Preparation 
of Indonesian Independence a large number of well-known prewar politicians 
and youth leaders.
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become the Republican Amy (TKR). ** Adam Malik was deputed to accomplish the 
formation of this National Committee. As for the first action-program, drawn up 
at Menteng 31 and later printed and distributed—Pandu and I formulated it, but 
it was Bung Adam Malik with his brilliant mind who dictated the final version. 
The [only setback was that] negotiations with Daidancho Kasman Singodimedjo 
to have the Peta directly and officially go over to the Republic ran aground.** 
Furthermore, when the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence 
met for its final—and subsequently highly controversial—meeting on August 
18th, ** it did, to be sure, approve the draft Constitution of 1945 and (on the 
motion of Oto Iskandar Dinata) vote in Bung Karho and Bung Hatta as President 
and Vice-President; but, at the same time, Oto Iskandar Dinata also proposed 
the dissolution of the Peta, arguing that "everything smelling of the Japanese 
must be abolished."*4
Wasn't this misguided patriotism on the part of Bung Oto Iskandar Dinata? 
The Komitd van Aksi did not regard it as a mistake of Oto Iskandar Dinata himself 
[alone], but rather that of the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian 
Independence as a whole, since it had a very damaging effect on the people's 
struggle to defend their Republic. Naturally the Japanese rushed off to order 
Peta's dissolution. Still, even without the Committee's proposal, the Japanese 
would have dissolved Peta—for they were afraid.**
With the dissolution of the Peta (Daidan Jakarta) by Daidancho Kasman 
Singodimedjo "thanks to his loyalty to his superiors," the strategy of the 
Komitd van Aksi had immediately to be revised. Adam Malik was deputed to 
stay continuously at Bung Karno's side, while the others organized the arming 
of the youth, an effort pioneered by the Pemuda API of Menteng 31.**
The Mass Rally in Ikada Square, September 19, 1945. *7
Ah, Historic Day that made all our hearts beat! It was the Komitd van Aksi 
that organized it. The Komitd was determined to show the world openly that the 
Republic of Indonesia now stood Sovereign and Independent, free of Japanese 
influence, and that it would be defended with the blood and soul of the entire 
Indonesian Nation. Like it or not, it has to be said that Bung Karno and Bung 3124567
31. Heiho~an indigenous auxiliary military force organizationally incorporated 
into the Japanese Armed Forces (unlike the Peta).
32. Kasman Singadimedjo, a prominent prewar Islamic politician, was in the 
Japanese Occupation period made Commander (Daidancho) of one of the two Peta 
battalions stationed in Jakarta during the Occupation.
33. The Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence had been 
established by the Japanese military authorities on August 7, 1945.
34. Oto was a well-known prewar Sundanese nationalist politician who during 
the Occupation became "adviser" to the Department of Internal Security of 
the Japanese Military Administration.
35. The author implies that the Japanese feared a major mutiny by patriotic 
young Indonesians in the Peta.
36. Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (Younger Generation of Indonesia), headed by 
Wikana, was the first organized youth group to appear in Jakarta after the 
Proclamation of Independence. The acronym API means "fire."
37. The Japanese name for the Dutch-period Koningsplein; today Medan Merdeka, 
the main square in the center of Jakarta.
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Hatta opposed the idea of the rally, arguing that the Japanese were still in 
[effective] control, and functioning as the policemen of the Allies. *• Further­
more, representatives of the Allies had already landed in Jakarta. They were 
thus afraid of a needless bloodbath. Indeed they did more than oppose. Both 
the President and the Vice-President threatened to resign if the mass rally 
was not cancelled. But by then the People had already filled the square to 
overflowing, pouring in from every region and waving the Red-and-White Flag, 
completely ignoring the Japanese ban. To hell with them [the Japanese]! 
For us pemuda, the threats of Bung Karno and Bung Hatta were kejam banget 
[Javanese, "very harsh"], even worse than a UN Veto today. So Bung Adam Malik 
was sent off once again to coax Bung Karno and Bung Hatta—whether they wanted 
to be abducted once again or were prepared to negotiate! For if Bung Karno 
did not appear [at the rally], a bloodbath could ensue. (We also threatened 
Bung Adam Malik that if he didn't manage to bring Bung Karno along....!!) 
In this way, Bung Karno was once again "fait accompli"ed. Fortunately Adam 
Malik was (thus) successful in his diplomacy. From that time on, Bung Adam 
was recognized among us as having a special "expertise" and for the first 
time acquired the nickname "diplomat." Naturally, Menteng 31-style diplomat!
Yet for us at Menteng 31 the Mass Rally at Ikada had immediate unpleasant 
consequences. That night, or rather just before dawn on September 20, 1945, 
the Japanese pounced. I was arrested together with Darwis; D. N. Aidit, Manaf 
Roni, Sidik Kertapati, M. H. Lukman, and Wahidin Nasution were also picked 
up. We were taken to the Kempeitei [HQ], ** and then to Cipinang Prison. 
However, since it became known that its [Head] Warden Jusuf was a relative 
of mine from Bengkulu, we were later moved out and incarcerated at Bukit Duri 
Prison instead.
After two nights there, Adam Malik joined us. I was taken aback to see 
him—we met while having breakfast. He laughed out loud, we smiled, then all 
of us burst into laughter. "What the hell are we doing here?" we said, one 
after another. Bung Adam said firmly: "Let's appoint Bung Hanafi our 'dictator.' 
We've got to get out of here as soon as possible . . . after all, we’ re [Indonesia 
is] Free." Why "Dictator?" we all asked in puzzlement. "So we can all be 
disciplined [by him], and carry out his orders without arguing!" said Bung 
Adam. So I divided the group into two gangs. Adam Malik and Wahidin would 
jump out [of the window] first, while Darwis and I would bring up the rear. 
We negotiated with Head Warden Pak Tengku Thajeb (father of Dr. Sjarif Thajeb),38 940 
persuading him to leave some pistols lying about on a table where they could 
easily be grabbed.
38. After Tokyo's sudden surrender on August 15, 1945, the Allied commanders 
were worried that Japanese field commanders in various parts of occupied Southeast 
Asia might arm local nationalists as revenge for their country's defeat, or 
might simply abandon the task of maintaining law and order until the victors 
arrived. Accordingly, all Japanese commanders were radioed strict orders 
to maintain the status quo of August 15.
39. The dreaded Japanese Military Police.
40. The Thajebs were a prominent family of Acehnese nobility long settled 
in Jakarta. Dr. Sjarif Thajeb was a pemuda activist in 1945, later became 
a well-known military politician, serving for some years as Minister of Education 
under the New Order.
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We still were not through with breakfast when suddenly I saw the Japanese 
soldiers climbing into a truck. The minute the truck had disappeared, Adam 
Malik leapt out of the jail, with the rest of us close behind. Two Indos 
who’d taken over guard duty at the gate (God knows where they had come from), 
their eyes popping out, tried to stop Sidik. Maybe because they saw two pistols 
in my hands, maybe too because Pak Tengku Thajeb roared out angrily: "Laten 
ze maar er van doorgaan als jullie niet dood willen -warden—Let them go if 
you want to stay alive!" the two guards stared bewilderedly and let Sidik 
go. I pushed him out ahead of me and we ran off and disappeared into the 
Djatinegara market. All Revolutionary Honor to Pak Tengku Thajeb!
Times change. During the New Order period Adam Malik rose from Minister 
of Trade to become Minister of Foreign Affairs; then rose again to become 
Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. I was happy to see him rise. 
In fact I wanted to see him become President—if possible. And why not? 
For the history of his struggle as a radical nationalist declared that: hij 
heeft het verdiend [he’d earned it].
At one time I felt bitter and disappointed in him. When he was Minister 
of Foreign Affairs I was dismissed as Ambassador to Cuba, and the passports 
of me and my family were cancelled—with the result that I could not return 
to the motherland. But later on Bung Adam and I, on a personal level, asked 
each other's forgiveness. All misunderstandings were straightened out. I was 
admiring and proud of him when he as Vice-President, along with President 
Suharto, announced the Rehabilitation of Sukarno the Proclaim er.41 About that 
time I met Bung Adam Malik in Brussels, it was October 1979. He was on his way 
home from attending the Non-Bloc Conference in Havana. Deeply moved, we hugged 
each other warmly, as old comrades-in-arms, in the presence of my children 
Demayanti and Dito, and of Alex Alatas SH, the Vice-President’ s Secretary. 
Even though our positions by then were as far removed from one another as 
earth and sky—he the number two man in the Republic of Indonesia that we 
all love, and I an exiled persona non grata—yet in our hearts, our spirit, 
there was no change [from the old days]. On the card he gave me he wrote: 
"Saudara Hanafi, I hope [to see] you and your family again in the motherland." 
I regard this card as the most cherished keepsake that Bung Adam could give 
me and my family.
It turned out that my meeting with Bung Adam in Brussels was our last. 
He had no more chance to wait for my return. Innalillah wa inna Illaihi Roji'un. 
For Bung Adam I pray: "May the Almighty with His Love guide you. Amen."
If I may express my hopes to the family of Bung Adam—as I wrote in the 
Condolence Book of the Indonesian Embassy in Paris: "I would hope that if 
possible the Government will permit his family to hold a tahlilan and a reading 
from the Qu’ran at Menteng 31, the historic headquarters of the Generation 
of ’45." For Tuhan Allah is pleased with praise and thanks be to Him as is 
appropriate.
41. In the early days of the New Order Sukarno was regularly denounced either 
as the mastermind of the "October 1, 1965 coup" or as strongly sympathetic 
to it. In 1970 he died while still under house arrest. In the later 1970s, 
for various political reasons, the Suharto government decided to encourage 
a cautious partial rehabilitation of his name.
